according to this washington post story the former administrator in iraq said: "We paid a big price for not stopping it [looting] because it established an atmosphere of lawlessness"
i would have been all for aggressive enforcement, looters ought to be shot. but can you imagine the outcry, when us soldiers kill looters? the theme would go something like this "oh, these poor people are driven to that out of desperation. they only want to feed their families, it is not right to punish them for that, they are merely trying to survive. they posed no threat to the soldiers and the soldiers murdered them..."

also bremer said: "We never had enough troops on the ground."
well mr. bremer, you were the one in charge until alawi took over, what did you do about it? you would just have to have asked for more troops and you would in all likelyhood have gotten them, but you did not.

I don't think he could've gotten them even if he had asked. Bremer disbanded the Iraqi army in May 2003, as Washington wanted to train a new one that did not have the stench of the baathists on them, or somesuch (not that there were anything to disband after they were completily wiped out by the ultimately efficcient american army, of course. At least, according to Washington, who initially claimed there would not be any need for more troops). This was Bremer's first notable decision as viceroy in Iraq after he took over after Jay Garner. Garner had on the fifth of May made the unwise statement that an interim government would be appointed in "mid- may", something that likely earned him his retirement from his job in Iraq. Also, he took much shelling for apparently not providing security fast enough during this period. The looting continued, and so on. Of course, this was because he did not want to proclaim something like martial law, and would not presume to have the authority to do so either, wishing that a popular interrim council could take the necessary steps instead, possibly at the same time bringing the US army into a legitimate support position with both the Iraqis and the rest of the world, hopefully losing their "occupier" status. He would for instance, contrary to evidence of course, maintain that his position was a humanitarian aid coordinator, perhaps to further suggest the american role in Iraq after the war had "ended".

He had nevertheless spent his welcome with the suits in Washington by this initiative of his and Bremer took over on the 12th of May. His mission was apparently to pave way in the political process, but without the immediate transition to an interrim government as a stated goal, unlike what Garner had. Instead, he announced that the group Garner mentioned as a possible interrim council: Barzani of KDP, Chalabi of the INC, Jalal Talibani, Allawi, among a few, would not be "a truly representative group" of the Iraqi people (funny, those names seem awfully familiar). And he noted that his office could happen to be in power for a bit longer than previously suggested. Curiously, at the same time a joint british and american proposal found its way to the UN intending to legalize the presence of coalition forces during the interim period. A French proposal that would limit this mandate to twelve months was rejected(by Washington).

In other words, by the current policy at that time it would not have been possible or welcome for Bremer to suggest more american troops in Iraq. It was believed by some key people, strongly, that this would not be necessary. That Bremer now says he could've avoided many problems by pulling in more troops initially, this really tells me that he is just as weak and fickle as the Kurds and Iraqi says he is, and that the diplomats would like us not to remember a single word of what they actually said. Frankly, it appears to me that they're trying to push the blaim onto the policy- makers, instead of admitting that they too employed some serious Bush- o- vision to make things look viable and better than it really was. Pathetic jokers. What comes next, I wonder? "We really didn't want to be in Iraq in the first place, please forgive us, we only followed our job description, even when we lied about how terriffic things were going".

The result is in any case that several american bases is being established in Iraq, and there appears to be no such thing as a withdrawal scheduled in the near future. And on that note, let us all join in feeling sorry for the US and how they regrettably didn't manage to come through with their selfless, nay, noble plan for a popular democracy in Iraq, instead facing endless waves of the evil hordes of the ungrateful hell- spawn in the middle east. Indeed, now a third of the world's oil reserves will regrettably be restricted and regulated by Washington for an indeterminable timespan, instead of being offered on the free market. Instead of an independent Iraqi army and an independent Iraqi government, the US will now be cursed with a military presence and a puppet regime most, especially the terrorist scourge, do not trust pretty much indefinately in the middle east. Yes, the american administration must certainly be weeping their tearducts dry because of their misfortune. Soon the most regretting ones will undoubtedly be heard wailing outside on the lawn in front of the Whitehouse while they cover themselves in ashes and rend their clothes. They'll be screaming to the heavens something like "We beg of You, allow us to hold popular elections in Iraq in spite of everything right now! And please let me get off the hook with that Halliburton business, Lord. I ain't asking for much!".

i do think he would have. i remember bush and rumsfeld repeatedly saying, if more troops were asked for, they would send them. however, that is just idle speculation, since bremer never did ask.that is utterly stupid, according to international law the occupier is responsible for provide safety (i.e. shoot looters) in occupied territory, once that occupational status is lost, there is no longer a legal base for using the army to police.do you know how long it took in my country to get an elected government back after it had been defeated in WW2? also our constitution was written by people, who had been handpicked by the allies and not legitimated by the german people.ah, and it is welcome now to come out and say this? you are painting bremer as a victim, who was forced to say things he didnt want to say and hold his tongue about things that concerned him.you still have american bases in germany too, why not complain about them? my city was officially under allied occupation until 1991 and it certainly did not feel like we had a puppet government.

That is gay. If they loot, shoot their ass down and dont care about the critisism.

"Everything's going according to plan, sir.... just double the amount of troops so we can provide the safety we should.". Anyway, you are remembering very wrong if you mean to say you think Bush and Rumsfeld was suggesting to send more troops right after the war "ended". That didn't happen. In fact, it is well known that Rumsfeld ignored advice from Pentagon and from people on the ground about the amount of troops, and did not admit that the operation would not be a complete breeze for quite some time. Of course, he insisted that there were enough troops, and that a legion of soliders were being sent(all the time) but that's not exactly the same.

The actual decision to send more troops to Iraq now is yet to be finalized, though. Lucky for those who don't want the draft, I guess.
I should probably have written "Illegal occupier", or perhaps "invader" instead.
Yes? I'm merely recounting how things happened. The point is that the ones not "truly representative" are the ones that ended up in the interim government anyway. And the target was always to make the transition to an interim government as fast as possible, to get the troops out, to "get the Iraqis in charge" as the hawks would say. Yet everything that was actually done seems to have caused just about the opposite.
Am I? You can't seriously say that it is just as damaging to Bush when Bremer says this now, as it would've been if he had said it right after the war "ended". Then it would've put Bremer automatically on the side of the Bush- bashers, the skeptics - or generally the ones spitefully in opposition and that would say anything to damage Bush. Now, due to the miracle of american media and short term memory, he can safely say what he does and at the same time assure people that the best thing that has ever happened to Iraq was the "regime change". It's different, see? But I don't think of Bremer as a victim, I think he simply couldn't have concieved of the thought of actually going against the policy decisions from Washington.
It occurs to me, though, that perhaps it is not the best comparison, post war Germany and Iraq? There were a few more labour unions in Germany than Iraq, I think, and it had perhaps been a democracy for some time before as well. Perhaps Bush and Rumsfeld also though the situation would be the same in Iraq as Germany? That is, without considering the fact that post- war planning for Germany started two years before the war ended. Possibly that is why their insane prospect was so far removed from reality as it could've been. And Bremer should've seen this, as many others on the ground did, but Bremer just bides his time and finds an opportunity to "regret" his obviously unavoidable mistake when it's too late to do anything about it. It's just laughable that the bootlicker actually can get away with it.

i did not write i thought bush and rumsfeld had suggested they would send more troops roght after the war ended. i wroteand i can remember about half a dozzen of interviews and pressconferences, in which bush, rumsfeld and the commanders in iraq all said, that the commanders woulg get all the troops and equipment they would ask for, if they asked for it, but they didnt. like this from april, 6th 2004:storywhat is illegal about it? there was a war that started in 1991 and now one party to this war has taken territory from the other. what is illegal here?the labour unions were all nazi organizations, remember it was the National Socialist German Workers Party. and germans had experienced 21 years of democracy before WW2. but if you dont like to compare iraq to germany, fine, i merely used it, because it is the first thing that comes to my mind for personal reasons. you can compare iraq to japan instead, they were a monarchy without labour unions.oh there were exactly the same complaints back then in germany too:

"Loss of Victory in Germany Through U.S. Policy Feared" November 18, 1945

Grave concern was expressed today by informed officials that the United States might soon lose the fruits of victory in Germany through the failure to prepare adequately for carrying out its long-term commitments under the Potsdam Declaration. Government failures were attributed in part to public apathy. The predictions of a coming crisis are predicated upon three points:

1) The failure to start training a civilian corps of administrators to take over when the Army's Military Government pulls out of Germany by June 1.

2) The failure of the Government to set up an expert advisory group, such as that which existed in the Foreign Economic Administration's Enemy Branch to back up the American administrators of Germany with informed advice and provide a focal point in Washington for policy-making on the German question.

3) The failure of the Allies to decide together, or the United States for itself, the crucial economic question raised by the Potsdam Declaration; namely what level of German economic activity is desired over the long term?

Still, Bremer said that they never did have enough troops on the ground. And my point was that early on it really wasn't an alternative, sending more troops. Later things have changed, that is true.
It's a matter of definition, I guess. I consider an invasion without the blessing of the security council as illegitimate. You could of course work around that and call the operation a continuation of the '91 war, because of the resolutions that most likely still were not fullfilled. But that argument will often have to pull in events prior to the Gulf-war, or events in the aftermath of Desert Storm in order to be justified. Other than that it would need to assume that there would still be stockpiles of wmds somewhere, asserted from for instance production potentials. It is stretching things a little too far, imo. For instance the British still seek this kind of legitimacy for the operation, and it was a point of view that more allies might be raised more easily if the war could be considered legitimate in this regard. I pulled in this only to perhaps explain Garner's early decisions to tone down the military role. Something that seemed, at that time, to be in line with the policy from Washington.
Well, I guess that isolated the labour unions weren't a very good argument. Yet one of the differences between the Iraq war and the second world war was that the fighting stopped afterwards. There were a victor and there were a sense of defeat on the other end. In Iraq there seems to have been too many strange alliances and intents to create this kind of atmosphere, and in addition the US was not immediately there to dictate how things should be. Instead they seemed to believe in that they would be "greeted as liberators" and so on, and apparently refused to see what was needed. And this has created a more difficult situation later. At least, that is what I think. Of course, what really ticks me off is that Bremer can actually admit to this now and still not instantly make a joke of every policy decision washington made. Oh, well.

iraq violated the conditions of the ceasefire by attacking planes patrolling the noflyzone and ejecting the inspectors. no need to assume anything.while there was resistance in occupied japan and germany, it was not as serious as in iraq. i am convinced, that the reason is, that the germans and the japanese people were broken and starving and desperately wanted peace. the war in iraq did not put enough strain on civillians and the combat was over too quickly, if the coalition had done strategic bombing of the cities and killed a few hundred thousands or millions and the people in iraq had been starving and then the coalition had come, it would have cost a lot less coalition lifes, as the people would be desperate for peace. caesar describes in his "de bello gallico" very well, how the gaulic tribes continued to give him trouble again and again. permanent pacification would only be achieved by facing off the enemy in a decimating battle, that would kill an enormous number of them. like in his very first campaign against the helvetii, caesar tried diplomacy, threats, small engagements, but nothing worked until in the final battle he had his troops kill a qurter million of them -men women and children- that is about 2/3rd of the tribe dead, after that the helvetii peacefully returned to their homes and never gave rome trouble again. to equate this with iraq, it would mean of the 22million iraqis, the coalition would have had to have killed 15million people, then the remainder would surely be extremely peaceful. now, for effect maybe only a few million or even only half a million would have been enough to break the enemys fightingspirit, but the members of the coalition are just too soft to go through with something like this and they chose not to do it.

A good point, but it is still events that happened in the aftermath of Desert Storm. And the resolutions at that time would reflect the current situation and deal with the establishment of the inspection regime, which it could be expected would not exactly be welcomed. But attacking inspecting aircraft like they did was a breach of the agreement then, of course. So, technically I guess, Iraq would still be in breach of the resolutions because of this, and any later "flexibility" in the Iraqi policy would by this logic be somewhat immaterial. So even when the inspectors were admitted again several years later, Iraq would still be in breach of the resolutions all the same. For, I think, this reason the Security Council petitioned for a new resolution just before the war started, a resolution that would clarify the demands in light of the current situation and perhaps make it possible for Iraq to comply. Or give them yet another chance, as Powell would say. I admit this is partly splitting hairs, though. And one might discuss, of course, whether a new resolution would be worth the effort or be needed in addition to res. 1441. Still, the events leading up to the war might suggest so, and then again they may not. Focusing on such things as the correspondencies with Iraqi officials in late 2002 and also for instance Blix's comments, both about the UNSCOM mission and the american delegation, could suggest that a new resolution would be needed in order to, as I said, clarify the goals and also give Iraq an opportunity, or even a possibility to comply. There was after all in the end the absence of documentation that made Iraq in breach of res. 1441, rather than the presence of it.
Probable. It might have been possible that the same situation could be fingered by keeping a dominating force present in the country, though. A point that many of Rumsfeld's colleagues brought up before the war by predicting the number of forces needed based on other recent peace- keeping operations, for instance in Bosnia. One general, I cannot remember his name, suggested something in the range of 500- 600.000 troops for securing Iraq.
;) Funny how the Bush- administration isn't nailed because of their theories about being "greeted as liberators", really. The recent senate hearings, as far as I could gather, adressed the fact that there were no wmds, even though the Bush- administration knew they were there. But the very optimistic picture of the outcome they sketched, one important part that was necessary to be believed in order to suggest the war as a good solution in the first place, that is left alone. I mean, how difficult would that be? It's not like it could cause a change in the general war- policiy of the US. Perhaps it would be more difficult to present a war as a better solution than exhausting all diplomatic means in the future, if something could be learned from the situation, but still...