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iraq violated the conditions of the ceasefire by attacking planes patrolling the noflyzone and ejecting the inspectors. no need to assume anything.
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A good point, but it is still events that happened in the aftermath of Desert Storm. And the resolutions at that time would reflect the current situation and deal with the establishment of the inspection regime, which it could be expected would not exactly be welcomed. But attacking inspecting aircraft like they did was a breach of the agreement then, of course. So, technically I guess, Iraq would still be in breach of the resolutions because of this, and any later "flexibility" in the Iraqi policy would by this logic be somewhat immaterial. So even when the inspectors were admitted again several years later, Iraq would still be in breach of the resolutions all the same. For, I think, this reason the Security Council petitioned for a new resolution just before the war started, a resolution that would clarify the demands in light of the current situation and perhaps make it possible for Iraq to comply. Or give them yet another chance, as Powell would say. I admit this is partly splitting hairs, though. And one might discuss, of course, whether a new resolution would be worth the effort or be needed in addition to res. 1441. Still, the events leading up to the war might suggest so, and then again they may not. Focusing on such things as the correspondencies with Iraqi officials in late 2002 and also for instance Blix's comments, both about the UNSCOM mission and the american delegation, could suggest that a new resolution would be needed in order to, as I said, clarify the goals and also give Iraq an opportunity, or even a possibility to comply. There was after all in the end the absence of documentation that made Iraq in breach of res. 1441, rather than the presence of it.
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while there was resistance in occupied japan and germany, it was not as serious as in iraq. i am convinced, that the reason is, that the germans and the japanese people were broken and starving and desperately wanted peace. the war in iraq did not put enough strain on civillians and the combat was over too quickly, if the coalition had done strategic bombing of the cities and killed a few hundred thousands or millions and the people in iraq had been starving and then the coalition had come, it would have cost a lot less coalition lifes, as the people would be desperate for peace.
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Probable. It might have been possible that the same situation could be fingered by keeping a dominating force present in the country, though. A point that many of Rumsfeld's colleagues brought up before the war by predicting the number of forces needed based on other recent peace- keeping operations, for instance in Bosnia. One general, I cannot remember his name, suggested something in the range of 500- 600.000 troops for securing Iraq.
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caesar describes in his "de bello gallico" very well, how the gaulic tribes continued to give him trouble again and again. permanent pacification would only be achieved by facing off the enemy in a decimating battle, that would kill an enormous number of them. like in his very first campaign against the helvetii, caesar tried diplomacy, threats, small engagements, but nothing worked until in the final battle he had his troops kill a qurter million of them -men women and children- that is about 2/3rd of the tribe dead, after that the helvetii peacefully returned to their homes and never gave rome trouble again. to equate this with iraq, it would mean of the 22million iraqis, the coalition would have had to have killed 15million people, then the remainder would surely be extremely peaceful. now, for effect maybe only a few million or even only half a million would have been enough to break the enemys fightingspirit, but the members of the coalition are just too soft to go through with something like this and they chose not to do it.
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;) Funny how the Bush- administration isn't nailed because of their theories about being "greeted as liberators", really. The recent senate hearings, as far as I could gather, adressed the fact that there were no wmds, even though the Bush- administration knew they were there. But the very optimistic picture of the outcome they sketched, one important part that was necessary to be believed in order to suggest the war as a good solution in the first place, that is left alone. I mean, how difficult would that be? It's not like it could cause a change in the general war- policiy of the US. Perhaps it would be more difficult to present a war as a better solution than exhausting all diplomatic means in the future, if something could be learned from the situation, but still...