I think Clarke came pretty well out of this with his testimony on the 24. of March. He explains what the Clinton- administration did, and what they unfortunately didn't manage to kill and maim enough and so on, but the essential bit is about what the efforts were during and after 2000, when there were a very notable increase in number of threats. Clarke mentions that they averted several attacks in this period, and that the efforts obviously were distributed widely. But his concern, as terror czar(or whatever) seems to have been primarily during this period what it might have been possible to do to kill off bin Laden and/or reduce and contain Al- Quida to a small group of no real threat.

What is interesting about this is that until and after 2000, the options for dealing with al- Quida seems to have been few, and unproductive. Cruise- missiles, covert operations and local groups trained on location. And none of this presented itself with any real solution, as it would take one of the cruise missiles several hours travel to reach it's target, at which time the recon would be outdated. Also, with the situation between India and Pakistan there were difficulties in sending missiles over their territory, and there were always the danger of collateral damage (which Clinton took much shelling over because of his missile strike in ..98?). The covert operations required much planning and effort, as well as unrestricted access to different areas, which was not available - nor was a traffic point through Pakistan at that time. The local war- lords of course was not necessarily loyal to the extent of taking orders, and would not undertake direct assassinations or capture- operations which was what Washington wanted. As well, it is mentioned that the Predator- drone could fly recon- missions, but not armed missions at this time.

So, during the change of office in January, what the previous administration would pass on to the next would largely be a then long standing and generally effective project, but a project void of any real success for getting rid of al- Quida.

However, when sept. 11 eventually happened, there were no qualms about engaging in a conflict with just about everything, and as an example the Predator suddenly did fly armed missions, according to Clarke, within a month after sept 11. As we also know, suddenly there were bases on the ground, Pakistan allowed safe passage, and so on. So the question is: Was this due to a serious effort to develop the plans already there, admittedly triggered by something that regrettably could not be foreseen - was a new plan developed - or was simply everything available dug up and thrown about in panic as a result of sept 11? If this commission manages to answer such questions, and there would be an opportunity for the current administration to explain itself on what it actually has done, and their reasons, much would be done.

Personally, I don't much care which person actually controls this cabal from the Whitehouse, but I care about how these options and missions are developed, and why they are employed. And while there continue to find itself happening these "scandals", in the "best intelligence community in the world", something should be done. In my opinion, the problem has always been that the options the president is offered is conjured up by either the CIA or some specially appointed council for solving one specific problem. And until that happens, the CIA and the rest of the intelligence community would stroll around doing whatever the hell they pleases. And these solutions would of course be always: deal with something once some visible crisis has arisen, and then act with overwhelming force. And, look where this got you this time, when the crisis happened to arise at home.


Transcript of the march 24.- hearings in the 911 commitee

And to the nether pits with: "FoxNews: insane news for insane times", or something similar.